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CIVICS 2000: PROCESS
CONSTITUTIONALISM AT YALE

Daniel J. Hulsebosch*
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS. By Bruce Ackerman.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 515. $29.95.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION. By
New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998. Pp.

Akhil Reed Amar.
xv, 441. $30.

One or another form of historical fidelity has long been in the
repertoire of constitutional interpretation, and during the last two
decades conservative jurists have searched for the "original intent"
of various clauses. Increasingly, however, it is liberal law professors
who are turning to history to make sense of American constitution
alism. What they find there is not a document listing eternal rights
or duties but rather a multidimensional structure of government,
captured as much in practice as on paper, that has metamorphosed
over time. It seems we have, in that familiar phrase, a living Consti
tution. But interest is shifting from noun to adjective: how, and
why, has the Constitution changed?
Two recent explorations are Bruce Ackerman's We the People:
the second volume of his epic trilogy of Ameri
can constitutional history,2 and Akhil Reed Amar's The Bill of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction,3 also part of a larger project.4
Each of these well-written books is a rich contribution to the histor
ical and theoretical literature of the Constitution and deserves a
large readership. Although they differ in style and substance, both
convey the same main point: the federal Constitution is premised
on popular sovereignty, made by the People and for the People.

Transformations, 1

* Samuel I. Golieb Fellow in Legal History, 1998-99, New York University School of
Law; Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. A.B. 1987, Colgate; J.D.
1991, Columbia; A.M. 1993, Ph.D. 1999 {forthcoming), Harvard. - Ed. The author thanks
the members of the Legal History Colloquium at New York University School of Law, as
well as Alfred Brophy, for helpful co=ents.
1. Bruce Ackerman is Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University.

See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (Volume 1 of the tril
ogy) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]. Volume 3, We the People: Interpretations, is still to come.
2.

3.
4.

Akhil Amar is Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST

PRINCIPLES (1997); AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FoR TIIE PEOPLE: WHAT TIIE
CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABoUT YouR RIGHTS (1998).
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The People have legitimately altered the document over the past
two centuries, through the Article V5 amendment process and
otherwise; it has also been interpreted, rightly and wrongly, along
the way. In short, there has been and will continue to be good and
bad constitutional change. Professors Ackerman and Amar try to
distinguish one from the other and offer guidance on how to make
better choices in the future. Though they occasionally criticize par
ticular alterations and doctrines on their merits, 6 the focus is on
how such changes are made. They are more concerned with the
procedures of constitutional changes than their consequences though they imply, as Ackerman has written before, that "form [i]s
substance."7 Together, their books signal the rise of a new strand of
constitutional studies, what might be called constitutional process.
Ackerman and Amar are at the center of this movement but are not
alone.8 It is a third-generation descendant of the legal process
school, which Amar has elsewhere described in this "rough-and
ready" way:
The legal process school focuses primary attention on who is, or
ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or
ought, to be made. Is, or ought, a particular legal question to be re
solved by the federal or state government? By courts, legislatures, or
executive agencies? If by courts, at the trial level or by appellate
tribunals? If at trial, by judges or juries? Subject to what standard of
appellate review? And so on. The question what is or ought to be the
substantive law governing citizen behavior in a given area is no longer
the sole, or even the dominant, object of legal analysis. Rather, legal
process analysis illuminates how substantive norms governing primary
conduct shape, and are in tum shaped by, organizational structure
and procedural rules.9

5. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitu
tion, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Con
ventions in three fourths thereof
U.S. CONST. art. V.
6. More so Amar than Ackerman.
7. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING .AMERICAN LAW, v (1984) [hereinafter
. . . •

RECONSTRUCTING).

8. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE LJ. 1119
(1995); cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1246 (1995) (referring to
recent work of Ackerman and Amar and stating that "I am tempted to note the emergence
of a distinctive new 'Yale school' of constitutional interpretation").
9. Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing PAUL M.
BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S THE F EDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(3d ed, 1988)); see also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99
(1995); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART JR. & Al.BERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW li-cxxxv i (1994); G. Edward
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Ackerman and Amar have inherited the earlier school's keen
sense of institutional competence. They are, however, more openly
normative than the mid-century legal process adherents.10 Their ef
forts - in truth, too inchoate to label a school - are similarly dis
tinguishable from second-generation democratic process theory
(best represented in the work of John Hart Ely11) because they hold
that some substantive values are immune from ordinary democratic
process and can only be changed by a complex constitutional pro
cess. Nonetheless, they concentrate on the means of change rather
than the political values that actually change. The examples they
give of the latter they find coherent and unproblematic: the
Founding institutionalized popular sovereignty, the notion that the
people could govern themselves; Reconstruction enshrined racial
equality; and (for Ackerman) the New Deal legitimated the welfare
state.
Ackerman and Amar have written large, dense books. No re
view can do justice to the intricate arguments of either, let alone
both. This review aims only to sketch the historical accounts in
each book, explore the premise of popular sovereignty in both, and
suggest what this tum to history indicates about American
constitutionalism.
I.

MAPPING CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Ackerman and Amar know the historiography of the federal
Constitution well. They delve into the primary sources of certain
transformative periods and offer many fresh insights about Ameri
can law and history. Their research substantially overlaps. Both
discuss the Founding of the Constitution in the 1780s (Ackerman
pp. 32-9 5; Amar pp. 3- 133) and Reconstruction following the Civil
War (Ackerman pp. 99-2 52; Amar pp. 166-294). To these,
Ackerman adds a third transformation: the New Deal (pp. 2 553 82). This is not the only difference between them. Ackerman's
perspective is broader, encompassing the whole expanse of United
States constitutional development. In contrast, Amar confines him
self to the (still capacious) story of the Bill of Rights, its origins and
revision in the 1860s. Moreover, Amar is more of a textualist, dog
gedly pointing out the repetition of key words, here in the main
body of the Constitution, there in the amendments, once again in
White, The Evolution ofReasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change,
59 V A L. REv. 279 {1973).
10. For Ackerman's critique of the legal process school, see RECONSTRUCTING, supra
note 7, at 38-42.
11. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
{1980).
.
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The Federalist Papers, and so on.12 As historians, both are more
hedgehog than fox;13 the big truth they know is popular sover
eignty.14 But Amar is more impressive when playing the fox. Tight
and full of close readings, his book might affect constitutional law
on the ground, perhaps footnoted beneath knotty analyses in the
United States Reports. Ackerman is after bigger game: the consti
tutional consciousness of the legal community.
A.

Ackerman's High Road to Constitutional History

"Th[e] focus upon successful moments of mobilized popular re
newal," writes Ackerman early in Transformations, "distinguishes
the American Constitution from most others in the modern world"
(p. 5). His fundamental claim, argued now for fifteen years,15 is
that the United States is a "dualistic democracy," meaning that its
constitutional history follows two tracks: "normal politics" and
"constitutional politics." On the first track runs most of American
political history. Ordinarily, government is administered by the
People's representatives, voted in and tossed out of office by a
skeptical public, who devote more time to private than public con
cerns. This is as it should be, thinks Ackerman, for there is more to
life than government. But then there are extraordinary moments
when the People think seriously about their Constitution. At these
times of constitutional politics, they may set aside the textual for- .
malities of amendment and redefine the parameters of normal poli
tics or "normal lawmaking."16
In his trilogy, Ackerman approaches the three moments Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal- from three angles. In
the first volume, Foundations, Ackerman established his dualist
framework, sketched his three-moment scheme of constitutional
history, and declared his desire to reconstruct for "the caste of
American lawyers and judges . . . something I will call a profes
sional narrative, a story describing how the American people got
from the Founding in 1 787 to the Bicentennial of yesterday."17 In
Transformations, he fleshes out the historical moments and traces
12. See, e.g., Amar at 27 (connecting use of "the People" in the Constitution, First
Amendment, and in the ratification debates). Amar labels as "intratextuality" such "textual
cross-references to the original Constitution and Bill" and relationships between the Bill and
other key English and American documents. P. 296.
13. For this distinction, see lsAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox: AN EssAY
ON TOLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY (1953).
14. See, e.g., Ackerman at 5, 13-14, 88, 92; Amar at xiii (arguing that "[t]he essence of the
Bill of Rights was more structural than not, more majoritarian than counter").
15. He outlined the project in Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).
16. Ackerman su=arizes his "dualist" theory in TRANSFORMATIONS, pp. 5-6, but for a
fuller treatment, see generally FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2.
17. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
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the different procedures used during each one to effect constitu
tional change. In the forthcoming third, Interpretations, he
promises to examine how the Supreme Court has made sense of, or
"synthesized," the People's serial transformations.
As has been pointed out,18 Ackerman's division of constitu
tional history into static periods punctuated by discontinuous
change reflects the influence of paradigm theory.19 The dualism of
normal and constitutional politics also artfully synthesizes the lib
eral and republican interpretations of American history, drawing on
both while avoiding the sterile debate of when (or if) republicanism
gave way to liberalism.20 Ackerman's "liberal republicanism"21 has
it both ways. The default mode of American constitutionalism is
liberal, meaning that individuals are usually content to leave gov
ernment to the governors and tend to their private interests. At
crisis moments, however, visionary leaders initiate a dialogue about
constitutional change and the People become republican citizens.
As has also been pointed out,22 Ackerman's logic suggests
Hegel's. His People move through thesis and antithesis toward a
new synthesis of freedom, then the process begins anew. The dia
lectic is everywhere in Ackerman's books, and the personification
of political phenomena comes to him reflexively. There are
"Madison & Co." (the Founding) (p. 33), "Bingham & Co."
(Reconstruction), and "Roosevelt & Co." (the New Deal) (p. 260),
in addition to "the People. "23 There is also an undercurrent of fa
talism in this otherwise exuberant tale: time and again whatever
happened is seen to have happened necessarily. But these are loose
methodological connections, for Ackerman avoids reliance on any
18. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1522-23 (1988).
19. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRU CTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLunONS {2d ed. 1970).
In an earlier book, Ackerman acknowledged the influence of Kuhn on his own structure of
thought. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 60 n.16.
20. See Daniel T. Rogers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11
(1992).
21. The term is used in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 29. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 91 YALE LJ. 1539, 1541 (1988). Similarly, though at a higher
level of historical generality, Ackerman claimed in his first volume that the Constitution was
a "creative synthesis " of the Greek tradition of "political involvement " and the "Christian
suspicion of claims of secular community . . . and (belief] that the secular state's coercive
authority represents the supreme threat to the highest human values. " FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 2, at 321-22.
22. See Drucilla L. Cornell, Institutionalization ofMeaning, Recollective Imagination and
the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1135, 1217 (1988).
23. In Transformations, Ackerman answers earlier charges of anthropomorphism by stat
ing that "'the People' is not the name of a superhuman being, but the name of an extended
process of interaction between political elites and ordinary citizens. " P. 187. Cf. p. 162 ("I
will argue that it was the People themselves who took this decision away from competing
political elites in Washington and decided it on their own responsibility. It is this decision of
a mobilized People, and not any textual formalism, that lies at the foundation of the Four
teenth Amendment. ").
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substantive body of political philosophy. So Hegel goes unnamed
in these books, as does, save one negative reference, Rousseau.24 A
more doctrinaire exponent of the People's political will might have
given them prominent roles (whether protagonists or antagonists).
Instead, even the supporting European cast of Edmund Burke and
Hannah Arendt in Foundations25 has moved offstage. The spotlight
in Transformations is trained on American political leaders, who
initiate change, and the People, who respond.
Along with the distinction between normal and constitutional
politics goes another: that between government and the People.26
This is a variation on the dichotomy, much older than paradigm
theory, the republican revival, and Hegelian logic, between a spe
cific governing administration and a constitution. Historically, it
was not always accepted; indeed, in the early modem English world
it had an oppositional quality about it. In the seventeenth century,
Edward Coke, John Davies, Matthew Hale, and other common law
jurists invoked an "ancient constitution" to challenge royal power.27
Similar was the contrast between a government of laws and one of
men, articulated pithily during the Interregnum by English coni
monwealthman James Harrington28 and circulated throughout the
Atlantic world by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century, becoming
commonplace in America.29 But perhaps the clearest distinction
between "the constitution" and "government" came in the early
eighteenth century from a former Jacobite and disgruntled Tory,
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke.30 In his view, governments
24. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 5. As for Hegel, Ackerman laments the turn
among early twentieth-century historians to Marx and social explanations of American his
tory, then celebrates the reclamation of the political by Hannah Arendt and the republican
school of historians, see id. at 200-209 (Chapter Eight, "The Lost Revolution"), which might
be interpreted allegorically as a recovery of the idealist thrust (though hardly the specific
political program) of Hegel's philosophy. See G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
(James Sibree trans., Dover Publications 1956) (1837).
25. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 17-24, 204-12.
26. See also id. at 6-7 (arguing that a "dualist Constitution" distinguishes between deci
sions made by the American people and decisions made by their government).
27. See J.G.A. PocoCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAw: A STUDY
OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 30-69 (rev. ed. 1987).
28. See James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in THE OCEANA AND OTHER
WoRKS OF JAMES HAruuNGTON, EsQ. 33 (1737) (1652). On the commonwealthmen, see
CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CoMMON WEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN THE
TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM
THE RESTORATION OF CHARLEs II UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN CoLONIES (1959).
29. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (Anne M. Cobler et al. trans., Cambridge
University Press 1989) (1748); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
30. On Bolingbroke, compare lsAAc KRAMN!cK, BoLINGBROKE AND His CmcLE: THE
PoLmcs OF NOSTALGIA IN THE AGE OF wALPOLE 4 (1968) (arguing that Bolingbroke and
other Augustan thinkers "saw an aristocratic social and political order being undermined by
money and new financial institutions and they didn't like it"), with Quentin Skinner, The
Principle and Practice of Opposition: The Case ofBolingbroke Versus Walpole, in H!STORI-
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came and went, some good and some bad, depending on whether
their ministers adhered to the transcendent English constitution.
This Bolingbroke defined as
that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived from cer
tain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed objects of pub
lic good, that compose the general system, according to which the
community hath agreed to be governed... . In a word .. .constitution
is the rule by which our princes ought to govern at all times; govern
ment is that by which they actually do govern at any particular time.31

The distinction provided leverage to criticize the Whig administra
tion of Robert Walpole while maintaining a posture of political loy
alty. Ackerman's point is that the two are not exclusive. His
"higher lawmaking" (p. 6) comes not from the fixed principles of
reason or other fundamental law tradition; nor is it ancient law.
Grounded on custom and consent, it is majoritarian, but of a spe
cial, dualist kind.32 That is, the Constitution is not merely the ag
gregate preferences of "the winners of the last general election,"
what Ackerman in Foundations calls "monist democracy."33 In
stead, it is based on a procedurally complex and restrained majori
tarianism - process constitutionalism.
Ackerman's new book is long ( 420 pages, plus almost a thou
sand endnotes) and took many years to write. He remarks with
disarming candor in his preface that
made many controversial historical claims, and I was
obliged to substantiate them if I hoped to be taken seriously. I re
turned to my historical manuscripts with trepidation. Rereading
them, I was impressed with the m1mber of relevant investigations that
I had not even attempted. Was I cut out for this job? [p. ix]

Foundations

Once he leaves the roman numbered pages and enters the arabic,
Ackerman regains confidence, as he should, for Transformations
goes far toward making good on his earlier promises. He is an ef
fective writer, though (deliberately, it seems) not an elegant one.
The reader must work through five-part moments, incessant italics,
and weighty capitalized nouns. Then come arrow diagrams, cross
self-references, and exhortations to go "deeper." Finally, however,
it all begins to flow and it matters not where you dive in, for the
whole thing circles around, making the same points at new levels of
generality. One volume blends into the other, themes of even earPERSPECTIVES: STUDIES IN ENGLISH THOUGHT AND SOCIETY 93, 126 {Neil McKendrick
ed., 1974) ("Bolingbroke simply wanted to remind his Whig enemies
of the views held by
the accredited theorists of their own party about the concept of political liberty, in order to
be able to make use of the immensely strong resonances of this tradition of thought to fur
ther his own wholly cynical and self-interested political ends.").
CAL

• . .

31. 2 BoLINGBROKE, A Dissertation on Parties, in THE Worucs OF LoRD BOLINGBROKE
88-89 (1841).
32. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 3-33.
33. Id. at 7-10.
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lier works resurface, and chits are signed for Volume 3. His goal is
to demonstrate that the American People, when amending the Con
stitution, have not always followed the "hypertextualist"34 require
ments of Article V; yet they have followed a formula that is similar,
and paradoxically more demanding, than Article V . "For
Americans, law-breaking does not necessarily imply lawlessness. It
is sometimes seen as a civic gesture indicating high seriousness."35
Their change has been "unconventional" (p. 82) but procedurally
regular. They may transform political aspiration into higher law by
a variety of institutional means� so long as they engage in a constitu
tional dialogue. Vocabulary and accent change; the dialogic gram
mar does not.
This structuralist formula for constitutional change has five
stages: signal, proposal, trigger, ratification, and consolidation (pp.
39-40). Because this formula was fundamental to the Founding of
the Constitution, it is intrinsic to it, not an interpretive outgrowth.36
The process has recurred successfully twice, during Reconstruction
and the New Deal. Ackerman tries to defuse the criticism that the
claim of recurrence is "a tell-tale sign of a grim determination to
impose my fivefold schema on constitutional history without serious
attention to the particularities of particular cases" by asserting that
"[t]he five-phase pattern recurs because the problems recur" (p.
67). Rather than a single instance, a moment is a contractual pro
cess, a series of repeated offers and acceptances between political
elites and the People. By articulating the proposed change to the
People, involving several governmental institutions, and heeding
the returns of transformative elections, the Framers of the three
constitutional transformations exercised statesmanlike vision and
prudence. And each time the People tendered well-considered
acceptances.
Rather than supposing that the People speak directly at the ballot
box, the Federalist precedent promises legitimation through a deepen-

34. Ackerman labels "hypertextualist" those who treat Article V as the exclusive means
of amendment. He does not call this position merely "textualist" because he argues that the
Founders meant to allow other modes of change too; they believed, as an originalist matter,
in "pluralist" methods of amendment. Thus his theory of unconventional change is middle
road textualism, neither hypertextualist nor extratextualist. See pp. 72-81.
35. P. 14. Ackerman could have cited historical works that examine the relationship be
tween constitutionality and legality or (a related theme) resistance theory. See, e.g., PAULINE
MAIER, FROM REsISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: COLONIAL RADICALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN QpposmoN TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776 (1972); JoHN P. REID, IN A REBELLIOUS
SPIRIT: THE ARGUMENTS OF FAcrs , THE LIBERTY RroT, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERI
CAN REVOLUTION (1979).
36. Ackerman refers approvingly to those who have rediscovered the "unwritten consti
tution" of the Founders but tries to avoid the textual-nontextual dichotomy. See, e.g.,
Thomas C. Grey, Origins ofthe Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Rev
olutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1127 (1987).
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ing institutional dialogue between political elites and ordinary citizens.
The idea is that a form of complex, and temporally extended, institu
tional practice will ultimately permit a group of revolutionary reform
ers a kind of popular authority that is qualitatively different from
normal electoral victories. [pp. 84-85]

In this qualified sense, Ackerman makes an originalist argu
ment:37 the writ of constitutional ejectment is not his; it is the
Founders'. To document his case, Ackerman begins not quite at the
beginning but rather the conventional beginning: the writing of the
federal Constitution.38 He argues that the Philadelphia Convention
engaged in illegal constitution-making. Article 13 of the Articles of
Confederation required unanimous approval by the state legisla
tures for any amendment. But the Convention took "the law into
its own hands" and became "a secessionist body" (p. 3 5), creating
the troublesome irony that the world's most famous constitution
rests on a coup d'etat. Well, Ackerman argues, not quite. The
Federalists put aside Article 13, but not constitutional process. At
each step toward organizing the new Constitution they won "offi
cial confirmations" for facially "illegal initiative[s]," thereby repeat
edly gaining "enough acceptance by enough standing institutions to
sustain their momentum" (p. 39).
Here follows an ingenious mapping of the "fivefold schema"
onto the writing and ratification of the Constitution. Instead of
"aiming for a single grand victory," "Madison & Co." followed "a
stepwise process - in which one partial initiative built on the next
in a series of sequential ratifications" (p. 42). They moved from
small conferences with limited agendas (Mount Vernon, Annapolis)
to larger ones, exceeding their mandate at each one, yet confirmed
along the way by some of the states or the Continental Congress.
Thus they signaled a desire to engage in higher track constitutional
creation and established a precedent for the illegality of the
Philadelphia Convention. There, Federalists proposed a new re
gime, and triggered "an entirely new procedure for ratification":
ratification by state conventions rather than state legislatures. Fi
nally, the Federalists consolidated their victory by obtaining legiti
mate support in the states slow to ratify: eventually, even North
Carolina and Rhode Island joined the "institutional bandwagon"
(pp. 4 1-65). All this is not to prove Ackerman can draw an impres
sive historical map. Rather, his ulterior motive is to demonstrate
that the Federalists earned "a deep sense of constitutional authority
even though they had not played by the rules" (pp. 39). They be37. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost ofLiberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REv. 918, 933 (1992)
(reviewing FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2) (accusing Ackerman of proposing a "liberal
originalism").
38. There are a few perfunctory references to the English Convention of 1688 as a loose
precedent for 1787. Pp. 33, 81-82, 162, 169.
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haved illegally but legitimately, adhering to a constitutional order if
not textual law.39
It is an impressive performance. There is something persuasive
and hopeful about dualism.40 It is wrong to consider the Founding
a conspiracy and morally attractive to emphasize the participatory
elements of American constitutional history. More were involved
than Federalists, government bondholders, or other elite groups.
And Ackerman correctly points out that the Constitution quickly
attained legitimacy. True, he leaves out the important role the Bill
of Rights played in this story, but Ackerman's scheme is flexible
enough to incorporate this fact (it might fit nicely beneath consoli
dation) and others necessarily omitted in a sixty-page rendition of
the Founding.
The flexibility of Ackerman's scheme resides in its abstraction.
This is not an unqualified good. The Annapolis Conference was a
"signal" for constitutional revision? For purposes of an historical
survey, it may be useful to see it as such, now. But does it rob the
actual moment, then, of its uncertainty? While Ackerman wants to
restore the agency of the People, he glosses over the concrete
choices made by key figures in the late 1780s, a variegated group
not well captured by "Madison & Co." Figuring who wanted what,
and realizing that not all the Founders (or the voting public, let
alone the larger majority of the People without the vote)41 wanted
the same thing, is not to backslide into Beardianism.42 In retro
spect, historical development often looks linear, graduated, and ra
tional. Depending on the facts marshalled, and how they are
arranged, almost any transition might be anatomized in terms of
signal, proposal, trigger, ratification, and consolidation. Like many
models, it is difficult to disprove because it is (abstractly) descrip
tive and (politically) prescriptive, but not explanatory. Historians
will criticize the theory and its proof not for being wrong but rather
for not engaging several interesting levels of analysis.
39. In Foundations, Ackerman stressed that he found the Federalists' constitutional
means, not their specific ends, attractive, and distinguished between "the revolutionary pro
cess through which the Federalists mobilized popular support for their constitutional reforms,
and the property-oriented substance of their particular social vision." FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 2, at 228.
40. See also Edmund S. Morgan, The Fiction of 'The People,' N.Y. REv. BooKS 46 (Apr.
23, 1992); Jack N. Rakove, Book Review, 79 J. AM. HIST. 226, 227 (reviewing FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 2) (1992).
41. See, e.g., "We, Some ofthe People": Apportionment in the Thirteen State Conventions
Ratifying the Constitution, 56 J. AM. HIST. 21 (1969). Ackerman touches all too briefly on
this problem of the extent of suffrage, which is surprising because his model of popular ac
ceptance hinges on electoral participation.
42. Ackerman flogged this much-too-dead horse in FoUNDATIONs, supra note 2, at 20103, 219-21. For similar reservations, see Morgan, supra note 40; Eben Moglen, The Incom
pleat Burkean: Broce Ackerman's Foundation for Constitutional History, 5 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 531, 543 (1993).

1530

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:1520

Most of these would involve greater specificity and Ackerman
might dismiss problematic facts as irrelevant where not assimilable,
so many trees and no forest. Others involve a higher level of con
ceptualization and a broader temporal frame.43 Take empire. The
history of the British Empire in America is off Ackerman's concep
tual radar. But the Empire comprised an important network of in
stitutions, constitutional languages, and practices - exactly the
sorts of things that interest him. And it mattered. It is not possible
to understand constitutional reform in 1787 without having some
grasp on how Britons in America had layered their institutions and
the ways they tried to reform the Empire not once but several times
in the century before the American Revolution, itself a rebellion
against imperial reconstruction.44 After the Revolution, political
debate continued in the key of empire: Should the Union45 become
a continental empire? A transatlantic commercial empire? An
"[e]mpire of liberty"?46 Some combination? Alexander Hamilton
referred to such questions in Federalist 1 when he exclaimed that
the debate over the Constitution "speaks its own importance; com
prehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of
the UNION, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is com
posed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting
in the world."47 In short, making 1787 a discontinuous moment no past, all future - obscures the Founders' conceptual architec
ture. Little wonder the People, liberal republicanism, Arendt, and
Burke flood into the vacuum.
Many concede that the 1787 Constitution was born in some sort
of illegality.48 But Ackerman argues that the Federalist act of crea
tion was no one-off. Like the common lawyers they for the most
part were, the Framers of the 1860s and 1930s followed the Federal
ist precedent closely. Modes of change changed; the Federalist five
part formula endured - despite Article V.49
43. On temporal frames in argumentation, see REcoNSTRUCDNG, supra note 7, at 53-55.
Suggestive essays include Jack P. Greene, The Colonial Origins ofAmerican Constitu
tionalism, in NEGOTIATED Au:rHORITIES! EssAYS IN COLONIAL POLITICAL AND CONSTITU
TIONAL HISTORY 25 (1994); John M. Murrin, The British and Colonial Background of
American Constitutionalism, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 19
(Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987).
45. An imperially resonant term. See A UNION FOR EMPIRE: PoLmCAL THOUGHT AND
THE BRmsH UNION OF 1707 (John Robertson ed., 1995).
46. Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, December 25, 1780, 4 THE PAPERS oF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 237.
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
48. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457, 465 (1994) (arguing that the actions of the
Philadelphia Convention were legal under the law of treaties).
49. Ackerman's argument that the 1787 Framers did not intend Article V to be exclusive
(pp. 71-81) is less compelling than his argument that, in fact, some future amendments did
not adhere to Article V 's rigid procedures. He follows the historical argument with a moral
44.
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But were not the Reconstruction amendments (numbers 13, 14,
and 15) passed pursuant to Article V? Not exactly. Ackerman re
lates how these amendments were, more or less, forced upon the
South. The Congress that passed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments was "a Republican Rump" (p. 106) and would not
have mustered the two-thirds majorities necessary if the former
Confederate states had been part of it. Paradoxically, the southern
states that ratified the Thirteenth Amendment were considered
legal for purposes of ratification but not for Congressional repre
sentation. Most of the Confederate states first rejected the Four
teenth Amendment, ratifying it only after a Radical Congress
granted freedmen the vote while denying it to many Confederate
veterans, and after Congress stipulated ratification as a condition
for its reception of southern representatives. "It follows that the
process by which Congress procured ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment simply cannot be squared with the text" (p. 111).
Q.E.D.: The Reconstruction amendments are actually
"amendment-simulacra" (p. 270). They might be justified as war
measures, but this strikes Ackerman as constitutionally unattractive
and historically inaccurate.
Rejecting the "dichotomy between legalistic perfection and law
less force" (p. 116), he finds instead the fivefold formula. But the
formula did not operate in exactly the same way as it had at the
Founding or for each Amendment. Here follows a gripping narra
tive of Reconstruction constitutional politics, the strongest part of
Ackerman's book. The People approved the T hirteenth
Amendment under Presidential leadership, while a convention-like
Republican Congress organized acceptance of the Fourteenth.
First, Thirteen. Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 signaled
that a "new movement had gained sufficient political authority to
demand that others take its constitutional intentions seriously" (p.
127). The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 initiated the propo
sal for constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.50 The presi
dential creation of interim southern governments served the
triggering function. Then Ackerman retails the fascinating details
one: later transformations were in fact more democratic than that of 1787; thus it "seems
morally bizarre, as well as legally inappropriate, to grant the Federalists the constitutional
authority to lay down the rules for subsequent efforts to speak in the name of the People" (p.
88). It is a subtle argument, not without problems: the Federalists had no moral or legal
right to constrain the People to Article V amendments; but future transformations must ad
here to their fivefold formula of non-Article V amendment
50. Ackerman here elides the story of how Lincoln's limited, and practically ineffective,
proclamation (freeing only those slaves inside rebel lines - thus not under Union control)
became transformed by an increasingly Radical Republican Congress into the nationally abo
litionist Thirteenth Amendment. See ERic FoNER, REcoNSTRUCTioN: AMERICA'S UNFIN
ISHED REvoLUTION, 1863-1877, at 60-68 (1988). Instead, he interprets the amendment
proposal as akin to the "institutional bandwagon ... generated at the Founding." P.134.
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behind southern ratification, rightly calling attention, for example,
to "the mix of legal and translegal elements displayed in South Car
olina," concluding it was "a classic case of unconventional adapta
tion" (p. 148 ). Finally came consolidation in the form of
presidential and secretary of state proclamations (pp. 150- 57 ).
Once again, Ackerman succeeds in demonstrating that fundamental
constitutional change occurred at a crisis moment in American his
tory and not by strict adherence to written procedures.
There were for Ackerman two procedural innovations distin
guishing the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment. First was pres
idential leadership, allowing him to "claim that a national election
amounted to a constitutional mandate from the People" and to
"lead[ ] other deliberative institutions to give their assent to . . . his
claim that the People have spoken" (p. 157 ). Here, Ackerman re
minds us that there were, effectively, two Reconstructions: Presi
dential and Congressional. (Among other virtues, this model sets
the stage for the New Deal. ) Second, the process was "more
nation-centered" than that of 1787 (p. 157 ). Reconstruction dealt
the states a blow, not least to their role in making unconventional
amendments. s1
The story of the Fourteenth Amendment is one of congressional
leadership. Congress's exclusion of the white South from its halls,
and Johnson's vetoes of Radical legislation, signaled another phase
of higher lawmaking. Then the Radical Republicans proposed the
Amendment. The Radical landslide victory in the 1866 midterm
election triggered fundamental change, bringing to Washington a
"convention-like" Congress, meaning that "its perceived legitimacy
reside[d] primarily in its appeal to the ideal of popular sovereignty,
rather than its established legality" (p. 168 ). Ackerman reads the
proposal as placing political identity above racial identity in Ameri
can culture (p.181 ), thus taking his stand with those who argue that
the Radicals were dedicated to the ideal of racial equality and not
just out to punish the "Slave Power."52 He also places the First and
Second Reconstruction Acts alongside the Fourteenth Amendment
as "triggering decisions - leaving it up to the (nationally defined )
People of each state to determine whether they would go along
with the nation-centered enterprise of constitutional redefinition in
itiated by the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 20 5 ). Then came ratifi
cation. Here Ackerman does not accept the partially extorted state
ratifications. Instead, he details various encounters between the
51. Historians have long debated how much Reconstruction altered federalism. Compare
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Searching for the Intent ofthe Framers ofthe Fourteenth Amendment,
5 CoNN. L. REv. 368 (1972-73), with WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FouRTEENTI-1 AMENDMENT
(1988).
52. Ackerman makes this clear in a footnote clainiing that "Americans can transcend
their racist instincts in response to the ideal of equal citizenship." P. 164, n.*.
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three branches of the federal government (conflicts over imple
menting Reconstruction,s3 the impeachment of President Johnson,
congressional revocation of Supreme Court jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases,s4 etc.), with Congress's repeated victories functioning
as ratification.ss In this non-Article V process, "the separation of
powers was taking on a key role in the ratifying process formerly
monopolized by the states" (p. 209). Finally, the 1868 elections and
a newly "packed" Republican Supreme Court consolidated the
amendment. The latter did so in the Slaughterhouse Cases. s6 Often
these cases are read as eviscerating the national citizenship that
Ackerman says the Radicals meant to establish, but his focus here is
process not substance: the important fact was that "Slaughterhouse
effectively ended all serious legal debate on the validity of the Four
teenth Amendment" (p. 246). What the Court made of them is an
other matter; Ackerman promises to elaborate judicial "synthesis"
in Interpretations (p. 251).
The New Deal confronts Ackerman with his greatest challenge.
The "professional narrative" of that era is based on a "myth of
rediscovery" (pp. 7, 259) that the Court finally abandoned the ille
gitimate review of economic regulation symbolized by Lochner v.
New Yorks1 and returned to a grand, Marshallian vision of federal
power. This was, understandably, the story legal reformers told at
the time. But it is historically incorrect and trivializes the revolu
tionary acceptance of the welfare state. It is especially important,
thinks Ackerman, to recover this transformation now, because
"[w]ith the Republican takeover of Congress in 1994, New Deal
premises are an object of sharp legislative critique" (p. 258). Such
fears date poorly; still, the People, or some portion of them, may
someday decide to alter those premises. In any case, Ackerman's
procedural point is that "[s]o long as America remains a dualist de
mocracy, the death of a generation does not consign its constitu
tional achievements to the junk heap" (p. 258). These
achievements, once again, were not funneled through Article V
amendments. This time, "amendment-analogues" (p. 270) came in
the form of extraordinary judicial decisions: "They memorialize the
rare determinations of a massive and sustained conversation by the
American people. These transformative precedents have, and
53. See, e.g., The Co=and of the Army Act, ch.170, 14 Stat.485 (1867); The Tenure of
Offices Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat.430 (1867).
54. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S.506 (1868).
55. Pp. 207-34. "Both [the President and Supreme Court] executed brilliant 'switches in
time,' retreating before impeachment and jurisdiction-stripping in ways that saved them from
permanent damage." P. 211.
56. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
57. 198 U.S.45 (1905).
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should have, a special status in the legal conversation. Since law
yers did not make them, lawyers cannot unmake them" (p. 3 76).
Article V was not the means for this constitutional revolution.
Instead, "[t]he New Dealers took a more nation-centered course using a series of national electoral victories as mandates that ulti
mately induced all three branches of the national government to
recognize that the People had endorsed activist national govern
ment" (p. 269). First, the Depression transformed the national elec
tion of 1932 into a "signaling election" (p. 281). Then came the New
Deal proposal in the form of "corporatist legislation" that
Ackerman claims would have "abolished market capitalism" and
replaced it with business management, under "Presidential leader
ship."58 Fortunately, the "Old Court" would not go along. Its re
jection of the early New Deal, in Ackerman's narrative, played a
constructive role of informing the People what was going on in
Washington and forcing the New Dealers to rethink their approach
to economic regulation. Hence the second New Deal: "Rather
than seeking to displace the competitive market with the NIRA,
Roosevelt and Congress now accepted the market as a legitimate
part of the emerging economic order - so long as regulatory struc
tures could be introduced to correct abuses and injustices defined
through the democratic process" (p. 302). This "more refined" pro
posal, entailing a "revolutionary redefinition of the citizen's rela
tionship to the nation-state," was the main issue in the triggering
election of 1936 between Roosevelt and Alf Landon, an election
that forced the People "to focus on fundamentals" (pp. 306, 309).
FDR and the Democrats were free to alter the constitutional order
- provided the Court allowed them to do so. Here is where the
court-packing plan and congressional proposals for formal amend
ment enter the story. There was, Ackerman claims, broad support
for both (consolidation). Only when the Court "switched" and up
held the second New Deal programs did popular support for coer
cion abate; "the spokesmen for the People in both Congress and the
White House quite re�sonably gave the Court a second chance to
redeem its continued democratic legitimacy without imposing har
sher measures in the form of court-packing or an Article Five
amendment."59 The Court complied: consolidation continued
apace, accelerating when an unprecedented third term allowed
FDR to pack the Court the old fashioned way.60
58. P. 286. This is a questionable interpretation of the "first" New Deal.
59. P. 343. For a different interpretation of the New Deal Supreme Court, emphasizing
doctrinal evolution over revolution, see BARRY CusHMAN, RETHINKING TiiE NEW DEAL
COURT (1998).
60. Ackerman refers to this change in Court membership as the second half of the two
phase process of constitutional "transvaluation." P. 372. Compare CusHMAN, supra note 59.
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Missing from this rethinking of the New Deal is legal realism.
Ackerman equates realism with negative criticism; lacking any af
firmative program, the realists offer little help to the progressive
legal thinker today. In particular, he blames the realists for the
"myth of rediscovery" that has obscured the New Deal's constitu
tional creativity. But an unwillingness to accept the legal realist
story of the 1930s should not blind one to the role that realism
played in the constitutional transformation of that time - whether
characterized as a dramatic switch, a thirty-year doctrinal evolution,
and/or a generational shift on the Supreme Court. Realism, in
short, supplied not just an interpretation of New Deal constitution
alism; it was constitutive of it. Ackerman tells the story well:
For twentieth-century critics of laissez-faire, the common law was the
problem, not the solution: its vision of property, contract, and tort
had created a false vision of economic freedom - ignoring the ques
tions of distributive injustice, monopoly power, and other market fail
ures that condemned millions to poverty and exploitation. Rather
than genuflecting before this common law vision, the New Dealers
sought to create a new foundation for economic freedom through
democratic politics and legislative reform. [p. 370]

There is no citation in this paragraph to any primary or secondary
source. Perhaps one can now take silent scholarly notice of realism
- but not at the same time criticize realists for failing to supply a
positive vision. For the attack on common law ideology, along with
an irreverent posture, came from Progressive legal thought gener
ally and legal realism in particular.61 What effect it had on the
People at large is more difficult to gauge. A place to start may be
with Thurman Arnold: law professor, New Deal administrator, an
titrust activist, and popular author.62 There are, after all, institu
tions other than national elections through which to influence
public opinion and by which public opinion exerts influence. Get61. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960
(1992); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 13-22 (1996); Note,
The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1973, 2008-14 (1990).
Earlier in the book Ackerman states that "New Deal doubts about Article Five reflected the
larger pragmatic revolt against formalism that had swept through much of American culture
during the early twentieth century," and admits that realists "expressed similar doubts, but it
is a mistake to exaggerate their direct role in this affair. The academics with the greatest
influence on Roosevelt - men like Frankfurter or Edward Corwin - were not Realists in
any narrow sense, but they were pragmatists." Pp. 347, 486 n.3. This is again a top-down
approach to the New Deal, and even on its own terms has problems: Frankfurter's "general
preference for the amendment route and his opposition to '[court-]packing' were well
known." Joseph P. Lash, A Brahmin of the Law, in FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX
FRANKFURTER 59 (1974).
62. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937); THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT {1935). Of the leading realists, Arnold has perhaps been least well served by
historians. A good place to start is THURMAN W. ARNOLD, FAIR Fimrrs AND FouL: A
DISSENTING LAWYER'S LIFE {1965).
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ting "beyond Realism"63 - as jurisprudence and history - may
enlighten. Omitting realism from an account of the New Deal does
not.
Ackerman applauds the substance of the New Deal constitu
tional revolution but has reservations about its modes. From the
perspective of constitutional process, a presidentially led, judicially
effected, non-Article V amendment-analogue offers too simple a
means for unscrupulous Presidents to alter the Constitution by fill
ing the Supreme Court with ideological Justices - what might be
called actuarial court-packing. This has been attempted, Ackerman
claims, most recently in the Reagan-Bush era, and it has led to "the
hyperpoliticization of the Supreme Court" (p. 415). He does not,
however, suggest sticking to Article V. Instead, he concludes
Transformations by recommending a statutory amendment process,
"the Popular Sovereignty Initiative":
Proposed by a (second-term) President, this Initiative should be sub
mitted to Congress for two-thirds approval, and should then be sub
mitted to the voters at the next two Presidential elections. If it passes
these tests, it should be accorded constitutional status by the Supreme
Court. [p. 415]

This procedure preserves the role of Presidential signaling (a posi
tive legacy of FDR's higher lawmaking), a crucial role for Congress,
and part of both Article V and the Reconstruction experience while avoiding the need for ratification by three-fourths of the
states. Demoted during Reconstruction, they deserve a lesser role
in the amending process.
For the most part, Transformations complements Foundations.
But in one important sense the two volumes differ: the author's
attitude toward the People's unconventional power that is central
to his story. Foundations was published in 1991 and Ackerman was
skeptical of the political atmosphere in which he wrote. He spoke
of Ronald Reagan's attempts at "transformative Supreme Court ap
pointments," "President Bush's proposal of a flag-burning amend
ment," and warned of "false positives" and "false negatives" when
testing for the five elements of legitimate change.64 In short,
Ackerman stressed how rare constitutional moments are and con
cluded that there was not one in the 1980s. In the final pages, he
recommended an unamendable Bill of Rights, like that in the post
war German Basic Law. True, even unamendable rights might not
be safe.
Nonetheless, entrenching the Bill might make the triumph of a Nazi
like movement more difficult. It would serve as a reminder to all fu63. REcoNSTRUcrING, supra note 7, at 72.
64. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 51, 320, 278-80.
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generations of a time when Americans solemnly recommitted the
nation to the unconditional protection of fundamental rights. . . .
I myself would be proud to be a member of the generation that
took this burden upon itself - finally redeeming the promise of the
Declaration of Independence by entrenching inalienable rights into
our Constitution.65
ture

In Transformations, Ackerman remains cautious about the pop
u1ar amending process, but is in the end more hopeful about and
supportive of constitutional change. What happened between 1991
and today? Mr. Dooley might have had an answer.66 Whatever the
cause, Ackerman now is not just an archeologist of popu1ar sover
eignty; he is also a (qualified) champion of it. He remains a dualist,
but thesis and antithesis are closer together now than then, which
may just be the logic of such things.
B.

Amar's (Nouvelle) Federalism

Where Ackerman rides the high track of constitutional politics,
Amar follows its twists and turns, surveying where the Founders
tried to lead the nation and where the Supreme Court has redi
rected it. In part I, a revision of an earlier article entitled The Bill
ofRights as a Constitution,67 his goal is nothing less than to tum the
conventional wisdom about the Bill of Rights on its head. He
shou1d succeed. Amar argues that the original ten amendments
were not intended solely, or even primarily, to defend individual
rights. Instead, they were designed to elaborate and qualify the
structural principles of the Constitution. Most important was feder
alism: the Bill was supposed to maintain the power of the states
relative to the federal govemment.68
To frame his case, Amar quotes James Madison in Federalist 51
"[i]t is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of

-

65. Id. at 320-21.
66. Cf. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DooLEY AT His BEST 77 (Elmer Ellis ed., 1938)
(observing after the Insular Cases that "th' Supreme Coort follows th' iliction returns").
67. 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
68. Charles Black Jr., has long argued for structural interpretations of the Constitution.
CHARLES BLACK JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969). Still,
no one has conveyed the message about the (Anti-) Federalist Bill with as much power and
sustained analysis as Amar. The fundamentally federal nature of the 1787 Constitution (in
cluding the Bill of Rights) has received new, powerful support from a host of early American
historians. See JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP
MENT IN THE EXTENDED POLITIES 0F THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES (1986);
JACK N. RAKoVE, ORIGINAL MEAN!NGs: PoLmcs AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CON
STITUTION (1996); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 4 vols. (1986-93); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1990).
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the society against the injustice of the other part"69 - and argues
that
[t]he conventional understanding of the Bill seems to focus almost
exclusively on the second issue (protection of minority against major
ity) while ignoring the first (protection of the people against self
interested government). Yet as I shall show, this first issue was in
deed first in the minds of those who framed the Bill of Rights. [p. xiii)

As Amar enjoins, "first things first" (p. 3). Does it matter that
Madison in Federalist 51 was not thinking about the Bill of Rights
(which did not yet exist)? Perhaps not, if he was discussing the
rights of majorities and minorities at a sufficiently abstract level.
Primarily, though, in this essay Madison sought to show that the
federal government, much more than the state governments,
obeyed the salutary principle of separated powers, which would
prevent one institution within it from predominating - in particu
lar, the legislature. The "vices of the political system of the United
States," as Madison entitled his survey of the states and
Confederation,70 made him fearful of legislatures. His goal in 51
was to explain how legislative will would be diluted and checked,
not to celebrate majoritarian democr:acy.
Just after the sentence in Federalist 51 that Amar quotes,
Madison explained how the structure of the federal government
(again, not the Bill of Rights) would check the majority: "Different
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a major
ity be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will
be insecure." He saw two ways to protect minorities. The first was
to create a hereditary ruler, embodying "a will in the community
independent of the majority." The second was to "comprehend[ ]
in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will
render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very im
probable . . . ."71 The latter was the way of the federal Constitution.
He was elaborating his argument in Federalist 10 that a large repub
lic mitigated the problem of factional majorities throughout the
whole and applying the same logic to institutional competition
within the federal government. Hence the bicameral, not unicam
eral, legislature. In addition, "[a]s the weight of the legislative au
thority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the
executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.
An absolute negative on the legislature, appears, at first view, to be
the natural defence with which the executive magistrate should be
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
70. "Vices of tbe Political System of the United States," 9 THE PAPERS oF JAMES
MAo1soN 345-58 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975). For a reconsideration of Madison's
influence on the Founding, see Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REv.
611 (1999).
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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armed." Madison had failed to get such a veto included at
Philadelphia; in Federalist 51 he proposed (as an amendment?) a
veto council composed of the President and Senators.n So much
for using Federalist 51 to frame a majoritarian interpretation of any
part of the Constitution.
.

However decontextualized his quotation, Amar is on to some
thing. He might have used Madison's Federalist 10 and 51 to make
an even stronger case that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect
the states (or localities) more than minorities had he contrasted
them with any number of anti-Federalist criticisms of the new Con
stitution as a threat to local control over government.73 In this jux
taposition, the Bill was, as conventional wisdom has it, designed to
remedy the weaknesses of the Constitution. But rather than pro
tect minority interests, it was supposed to protect more familiar in
stitutions - state and local - from the new, distant, and purposely
elitist federal government. To push this interpretation farther,
there may be more protection of minorities (economic and re
gional) in the main body of the Constitution than in the Bill of
Rights. But this would require revisionism on a scale quite beyond
even that of Amar's.

Similarly, Amar is right to emphasize the importance of the jury
in eighteenth-century America. For him, the jury connotes local
ism, fear of distant decisionmakers, populism, and majority rule.
He is right about the first two. In a constitutional history of the
British Empire, the American Revolution, and early United States,
it would be hard to exaggerate the jury; it was a metaphor for local
ism, due process, and open lawmaking and enforcement. Eben
Moglen reminds us that there was a "cluster" of rights associated
with the jury, many not individual but rather communal rights.74
Amar drives this theme home effectively. Too effectively. Localism
is not - at least, was not in the eighteenth century - the same as
populism or majoritarianism. The latter words were foreign to both
Federalists and anti-Federalists, few of whom were democrats.75
Nor was it identical to the province or state, notwithstanding
72. Id. at 351-52. See also Larry D.Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARv. L.
611, 627-36.

REv.

73. See generally 1 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (1981).
74. See Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1086, 1114 (1994); see also WILLIAM E.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE CoMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).
75. Amar enjoins lawyers to study "the lessons of the 'republican revival,'" which he
equates with majoritarian government. P. 302. But see BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 282 (1967) (noting that '"democ
racy' ... was generally associated with the threat of civil disorder and the early assumption of
power by a dictator").
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Amar's repeated equation of "local" with "state."76 Instead, it con
noted a jurisdiction smaller :;ind more manageable. The social poli
tics in these places were quite complex, varying widely across space
and through time, but few historians would characterize them as
populist; rather, they would talk of deference society, some of oli
garchy, others of violent subcultures defying simple characteriza
tion.77 Whatever the nature of the Revolution, the constitutional
debate certainly was about who should rule at home - and the
boundaries of that home.
So the jury deserves a closer look. As those most familiar with
law enforcement in early America have noted, the ideal of the jury
trial had its limits. When it came to everyday crime, the jury was
seen by provincial legislative houses as obstructionist - as it was by
imperial eyes in gubernatorial forts, Council chambers, and in
Whitehall. Thus colonial legislatures became innovators in the
business of summary jurisdiction: quick, efficient criminal process,
without juries.78 To risk too fine a point, what was good enough for
urban rowdies, slaves, and frontier squatters was not good enough
for transatlantic merchants and substantial land speculators.
Of course, these "lawless" elements could invoke the jury, too.
For them, the jury functioned as a safety valve against both imperial
and provincial jurisdiction, vindicating interests as local as those of
a family.79 Some of them helped ensure that the jury was guaran
teed in several state constitutions (a point worth revisiting), though
colonial summary justice endured written constitution-making in
tact.80 Intraprovincial jurisdictional politics (for lack of a better
phrase), like imperial-provincial jurisdictional politics, was a real
phenomenon, though undertheorized and also unnamed. After the
Revolution, the latter received a name (federalism); the former did
not. By framing the controversy as the federal government (and
the People) versus the states, the Federalists (in part accidentally)
eliminated local government from the articulate debates over the
Constitution. Yet local units remained important parts of the gov
ernmental order. Unfortunately, the fate of this intraprovincial fed76. On the contemporary ambiguity of "state," see J.R. Pole, The Politics of the Word
"State" and its Relation to American Sovereignty, 8 PARLIAMENTS, EsTATES AND REPRESEN
TATION 1 (1988).
77. A convenient overview is PoUTics AND SocIETY IN COLONIAL AMERICA: DEMOC
RACY OR DEFERENCE? (Michael G. Kammen ed., 1967).
78. See Juuus GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CoLO·
NIAL New YoRK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776) 379-83 (1970); Moglen,
supra note 74, at 1105-11.
79. See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of Empire
in New York, 1750-1777, 16 LAW & HIST. RBv. 319, 350-54 (1998).
80. See, e.g., Jackson ex dem. Wood v. Wood, 2 Cow. 819 (N.Y. 1824) (upholding special
sessions trial for petit larceny without indictment or jury because colonial practice was incor
porated into the state constitution).
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eralism remains one of the under examined mysteries of the
American Revolution and the early United States.81 In the consti
tutional debate, local government was the dog that did not bark.
Or did it? Amar inadvertently permits us to listen again. When
anti-Federalists championed the jury, the militia, church establish
ments, and so forth, many meant to protect the states, certainly, but
some also hoped to vindicate those familiar local worlds. This is
what makes Amar's work so intriguing. He comes close to redis
covering those worlds in Chapter Three, on "The Military Amend
ments." There he argues that "the right of the people to keep and
bear arms" for purposes of "a well regulated Militia'' was a "states'right," not an individual right (p. 52). Given the choice, he is more
correct than not. But he acknowledges that "this chain of argument
has some weak links" (p. 52). The same language appears in sev
eral state constitutions, suggesting that the militias and arms
bearing were not fully controlled by the states. While state govern
ments could (as the federal government could) organize and disci
pline militias in emergencies, they too lacked the power to disarm
their members (p. 52). It is to Amar's credit that he concedes
problems with a "states'-rights" reading of the Second Amendment.
But he declines his own invitation to explore how the militia actu
ally functioned. It has its historians, and they tell us that it was a
local institution - which is to say, more often than not, organized
by elites at the most local level, county or town.82 The state-versus
individual model fails to capture these provincial sociopolitics.
Which brings us back to anti-Federalist worship of the jury.
Time and again anti-Federalists criticized the Constitution for not
specifying that criminal jury trials would be held in the vicinage of
the alleged crime and failing to guarantee the jury trial in federal
81. Excellent exceptions include HENDRIK HARTOG, Ptmuc PROPERTY AND PRIVATE
POWER: THE CoRPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870
(1983), and WILLIAM J. NovAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY .AMERICA (1996). For an analysis of local government in practice,

see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990), and Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II
Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 346 (1990).
82. The jealous localism of these outfits was the bane of a string of imperial commanders
- from British commanders in chief to George Washington - and one of the reasons why
the federal government was given the power to raise an army. See LAWRENCE D. CRESs,
CITIZENS IN ARMs : THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN SocIETY TO THE WAR OF
1812 (1982); JAMES KIRBY MARTIN & MARK EDWARD LENDER, A REsPECTABLE ARMY:
THE MILITARY ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763-89 (1982); JoHN P. REID, IN DEFIANCE OF
THE LAw: THE STANDING-ARMY CoNTROVERSY, THE Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COM
ING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1981); JOHN SHY, A PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED:
REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 23-33 (1976);
JOHN SHY, TOWARD LEXINGTON: THE ROLE OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE COMING OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3-20 (1965); Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America:
The Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST. REv. 567, 589 (1998);
Louis Morton, The Origins of American Military Policy, 22 MIL. AFF. 75 (1958).
-
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civil trials at all. Hamilton responded to the latter complaint in
by surveying the state legal systems. He pointed out
that "there is a material diversity as well in the modification as in
the extent of the institution of trial by jury in civil cases in the sev
eral states."83 In light of this diversity, the Constitutional
Convention could not have created a general rule consistent with all
the state systems. Hamilton treated state proposals for a jury
amendment as unworkable and unwise. Such an amendment was
unworkable because it might require the federal courts to alter their
use of juries as they circulated among the states: "The capricious
operation of so dissimilar a method of trial in the same cases, under
the same government, is of itself sufficient to indispose every well
regulated judgment towards it."84 It was also unwise, for "there are
many cases in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one":85 for
example, diplomatic cases, those involving the law of nations, prize,
and equity. Perhaps the Convention might have used "one state as
a model for the whole," but in the end it was thought best to leave
the "arduous" task of devising a uniform plan to "the discretion of
the legislature."86

Federalist 83

Anti-Federalists got their jury amendments: the Sixth guaran
teed a local jury in criminal cases, the Seventh declared that "In
Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury should be pre
served. "87 It would seem that this compromissary language ignored
the difficulty Hamilton and others pointed out, that there was
among the states no standard against which to determine when and
how to use the jury in federal civil trials. Amar concludes that the
Seventh Amendment was designed to incorporate that diversity:
83. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 566 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Id. at 567 (referring to the proposal of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
85. Id. at 568.
86. See id. at 566-67; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton); JAMES
MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 630, 647 (1966),
The jury trial provision evoked little discussion in Philadelphia, reaching the table late in the
proceedings. For a shrewd foreshadowing of Hamilton's logic, which soon became conven
tional Federalist wisdom, see the comments of James Wilson several montlls earlier at the
Pennsylvania ratification convention. See James Wilson, Address at tlle Convention of the
State of Pennsylvania (Dec. 7, 1787) in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CoNVEN·
TIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 486, 488 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d
ed. 1937) [hereinafter DEBATES]; James Wilson, Address at a Public Meeting in the Penn
sylvania State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787) in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HisTORY OF TIIE RATIFI·
CATION oF THE CONSTITUTION 339, 340-31 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1981 ); see also Thomas Dawes, Address at the Convention of tlle State of Massachusetts (Jan.
30, 1788) in 2 DEBATES, supra, at 113, 114; James Iredell, Address at the Convention of the
State of NortlI Carolina (July 28, 1788), in 4 DEBATES, supra, at 144, 144-45 (relying on Mr.
Spaight's comments regarding jury trials in civil cases); id. (July 29, 1788), in 4 DEBATES,
supra, at 164, 165-66; James Madison, Address at the Convention of the State of Virginia
(June 20, 1788), in 3 DEBATES, supra, at 531, 534-35; Charles Pinckney, Address at the Con
vention of tlle State of South Carolina (Jan. 16, 1788), in 4 DEBATES, supra, 253, 260.
87. U.S. CoNST. amend. VII.
84.
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the federal courts were to employ the jury, or not, as state law
where they sat dictated, notwithstanding administrative inefficien
cies. In short, the Founders intended federal courts to follow a "dy
namic" approach to procedure (pp. 89-93) like that now used fo r
substantive law under Erie. There is evidence that a few anti
Federalists did indeed assume that jury trials in the federal courts
would fluctuate with location.88 But most did not give too much
thought to how the guarantee would operate in practice. As
George Mason, a Virginia anti-Federalist, said in Philadelphia, the
diversity of state practice meant that "jury cases can not be speci
fied. A general principle laid down on this and some other points
would be sufficient."89 The key, as always, was the principle of the
jury; here, as with those "other" principles, practical operation was
ignored. It is difficult to conclude, with Amar, that a "dynamic"
approach to the civil jury is most faithful. Many agreed with
Hamilton that Congress should determine a standard form.90 It
never did. Instead, the Supreme Court, per Justice Joseph Story,
laid down a historical test that looked to English practice in 1791,91
when the amendment was adopted- an option no one discussed at
that time. But this fitted Justice Story's transcendental, Anglocen
tric conception of the common law, which served a variety of intel
lectual and political purposes in antebellum America.92 Federalist
politics inspired in Hamilton and others a moment of positivist ap
prehension of the common law, but a generation later the nature of
those politics had changed and so too the attitude of Federalist leg
atees toward the common law.93
Amar might agree that intrastate localism was an important ele
ment in the original constitutional order, but this would not affect
his analysis of Reconstruction. The point of Part II of his book is
88. See Charles W.Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 51
MINN.L. REv.639, 712-13 (1973).
89. MADISON, supra note 86, at 630.
90. See Wilson, Address at the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania, supra note 86, at
488; Wilson, Address at a Public Meeting in the Pennsylvania State House Yard supra note
86, at 344; see also Dawes, supra note 86, at 114; Iredell, Address at the Convention of the
State of North Carolina (July 28, 1788), supra note 86, at 144-45; id. (July 29, 1788), supra
note 86, at 165-66; Madison, supra note 86, at 534-35; Pinckney, supra note 86, at 260.
91. See Swift v.Tyson, 41 U.S.(16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
92. The best study of these dynamics remains PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE Mrno IN
AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CrviL WAR 99-265 (1965).
93. There are many moments of positivist perception of the co=on law scattered
throughout Anglo-American history. Rarely mere intellectual epiphanies, they arise instead
amidst concrete political controversies - or, more accurately, operate as arguments within
those controversies. Cf. Ackerman, Transformations, at 370-72; Amar, supra note 9, at 69495; Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects ofVolume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory,
110 HARV.L. REv.1785, 1786 (1997) (arguing that "Erie-effects" are "product[s] of a certain
respect for democratic authority"); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fi
delity and Theory, 41 STAN.L. REv.395, 426-32 (1995) (discussing Justice Holmes's repudia
tion of Justice Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.(16 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
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that the Reconstruction amendments demoted federalism, the
states, and implicitly all local units in the constitutional order. Here
is where the individualist connotation of the Bill of Rights emerged.
In short, the Founder's structural Bill became our minorities
protective Bill; states' rights became individual rights. No longer
partners in an ambiguous division of governmental duties, the states
were subordinated in the constitutional hierarchy, and the federal
government defined the rights of federal citizenship.94
The shift was not as stark as all that. Amar nicely describes how
the more individualistic interpretation enjoyed an underground life
during the antebellum period.95 Always latent, it came out of reces
sion and into dominance with the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.
Having traced the structure-to-rights transformation, Amar
turns to the issue of whether the framers of Reconstruction in
tended to incorporate the first ten amendments against the states.
In a subtle theory of "refined incorporation," Amar argues that
some should be incorporated and some should not. In any case, the
vehicle should be the Privileges and Immunities Clause, not the
Due Process Clause, for Amar argues that the crux of
Reconstruction was the redefinition of national citizenship. In de
termining whether this or that right is a privilege of national citizen
ship, he embraces neither the "traditions of · English liberty"
approach associated with Justice Felix Frankfurter nor the total in
corporation approach of Justice Hugo Black. He instead asks
whether a particular protection "is a personal privilege - that is, a
private right - of individual citizens, rather than a right of states or
the public at large" (p. 22 1 ). If the latter, then it seems to him con
tradictory to apply the states'-right against the states. But if it is an
individual right, or a structural right that was transformed into an
individual right, then it should be incorporated against the states.
The most interesting example of the last sort is the First
Amendment's prohibition against religious establishments. Many
states had established churches in 1789; the fear behind the Estab
lishment Clause was that the federal government might erect a na
tional church similar to the Church of England. Amar nicely calls it
"a home rule - local option provision" (p. 246 ). Thus it is, from an
originalist perspective, illogical to incorporate the clause, as it was
supposed to protect some state establishments.9 6 But Amar argues
94. For a similar earlier interpretation, see Kaczorowski, supra note 51, at 398 (arguing
that the Fourteenth Amendment "wrought nothing less than a revolution in American feder·
alism" and enlarged the civil rights guaranteed by national citizenship).
95. See also William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Anti-Slavery Movement Upon Styles of
Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1974).
96. See Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitll·
tional, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2347 (1997).
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that the disestablishment of state churches by Reconstruction and
the prohibition of establishments in the Western territories together
transformed constitutional attitudes toward religion: there was fear
of any state favoritism toward particular denominations. This was
not because of declining religiosity; perhaps just the opposite. The
splintering of old denominations and creation of new ones in
creased mutual suspicions. In a perfect world, some denominations
would have liked state support. In early national America, how
ever, better that the state remain neutral.97
Incorporating "the freedom of speech, or of the press," is easier.
It was from the beginning a mixed right, of states (relating to parlia
mentary privileges) and individuals (for example, the right to peti
tion).98 The rights interpretation spread in reaction to Southern
suppression of abolitionist literature and reached the Congressional
Record in the 1860s (pp. 235-39). But again Amar's analysis is too
neat. While exploring the intersection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, he looks ahead one hundred years to justify modern
free speech doctrine. In particular, he must confront "the doctrinal
rules crafted by Sullivan and its progeny [that] reflect obvious suspi
cion of juries - resulting, for example, in various issues being clas
sified as legal questions or mixed questions of law and fact
inappropriate for unconstrained jury determination." (p. 243).
Where has the jury gone?

Once the Fourteenth Amendment is on the books, the agency theory
of free speech is less explanatory than the minority-protection theory,
for the latter better accounts for speech limitations on majoritarian
state legislatures. And the minority-protection theory suggests a dif
ferent optimal allocation between judge and jury. [p. 244]
This is quite a jump and leaves out much history of the relationship
between judge and jury in American law.99 And why is Amar cer
tain that judges are more competent guardians of rights than juries?
He never explains; he might assume that it has something to do
with the different origins, socialization, and peer group of those
who rise to the bench compared to those in the jury box. But this
sort of history resides in sources largely outside those he explores
- largely, but not completely, for such reasoning is similar to
Hamilton's celebration of a cosmopolitan judiciary in Federalist 78,
81, 82, and 83.
97. See NATiiAN 0. HATCH, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY
(1989). This attitude began in some colonies before the Revolution. See Perry G.E. Miller,
The Contribution of the Protestant Churches to the Religious Liberty in Colonial America, 2
HARV. REv. 60, 69 (1964).
98. Though this too was a mixed individual and state right. See Gregory A. Mark, The
Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2153, 2178-87 (1998).

99. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 74, at 165-74.
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Finally, Amar claims that the individualistic interpretation of
the Bill is a product of Reconstruction. But most of the cases cited
to prove this date much later, the most important after 1890, mak
ing for a long Reconstruction moment.100 More importantly,
Amar's three-level institutional framework - nation, state, and in
dividual - makes it difficult to see other ways to interpret the con
stitutional shift of the late nineteenth century. As with the lack of
focus on local government at the Founding, the automatic move
from state to individual misses other actors: groups located be
tween the state and the individual. Amar writes that "between 1775
and 1866 the poster boy of arms morphed from the Concord min
uteman to the Carolina freedman" (p. 266; emphasis added). But
was that Carolina freedman a single, rights-bearing individual? Or
did his right (assuming Amar is correct that he had one1°1) depend
on a different but still collective identity, namely, as a newly liber
ated African American in the deep South? The problem here par
allels that of equating the local with the state at the Founding. In
short, is the story of the Bill of Rights from Reconstruction to the
present really about individual rights?102 Would not an account
that emphasized solicitude for groups help explain both the
Slaughterhouse Cases103 as well as those overruling them, including
Santa Clara County, standing for the proposition that corporations
were constitutional people too?104 Instead, Amar's iconoclastic
narrative turns back toward the conventional wisdom. Only the
dates were wrong. Having corrected those, his story becomes famil
iar: "the Reconstruction generation - not their Founding fathers
100. By the 1890s, this rhetorical trickle had swelled into a steady stream of references
to the "first ten amendments . . . in the nature of a bill of rights" to protect "persons and
property" and "unalienable rights" . . . . Gone was the view, publicly expressed by
Supreme Court Justice Samuel F. Miller as late as 1880, that "our Constitution, unlike
most modem ones, does not contain any formal declaration or bill of rights."
Pp. 287-88 (first omission in original, endnotes omitted).
101. See RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, "Never Intended to Be Applied to the
White Population": Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity - The Redeemed South's Leg
acy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1307 (1995).
102. See AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 80-101 (1995); Owen M. Fiss,
The Supreme Court 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1979); Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence ofBrown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 599, 604-13 (1979); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1072-77 (1980).
103. 83 U.S. 36 (1872). Herbert Hovenkamp illuminates the background to these cases in
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 117-24 (1991).
104. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The emergence
of the "real entity" theory of the corporation was actually a gradual process in the late 19th
century. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate The
ory, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 173 (1985-86); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441 (1987); see also Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Reflections on Monell v. Department of Services, URB. LAW. (forthcoming
1999) (arguing that "the conclusion [in MonellJ that [the Reconstruction] Congress intended
municipal corporations to be sued under sec. 1983 is far from compelling").
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or grandfathers - took a crumbling and somewhat obscure edifice,
placed it on new, high ground, and remade it so that it truly would
stand as a temple of liberty and j ustice for all" (p. 288).
One can disagree with Amar's analysis of whether a particular
right represents a state prerogative, a privilege or immunity of na
tional citizenship, or a group right, but the theory of refined incor
poration has much to offer. Also intriguing is his suggestion that
the Bill be approached "holistically," rather than as "discrete blocks
of text, with each segment examined in isolation" (pp. xi-xii). His
torically this makes much sense; j urisprudentially, it may be based
upon unreal expectations about how adj udication operates. In the
end, Amar is not terribly concerned about the latter because he
believes that "[s]elective incorporation is largely right in result and
instinct," so that "today's j udges and lawyers have often gotten it
right without quite realizing why."105 He does not elaborate what
he means here by "right" but implies that judges should interpret
the amendments according to the historical meaning ascribed to
their text when written, or in light of new meanings generated by
subsequent constitutional experience similarly memorialized in
text. He, like Ackerman, is engaged in a form of evolutionary
originalism. Tue means and telos of this process is popular
sovereignty.
II.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

Despite the many differences between these books, popular sov
ereignty is the dominant theme in both. In their collective constitu
tional history, federalism becomes less important after the Civil
War, and the separation of powers has always been a secondary
theme. Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, was fundamental to
the Constitution's creation, played a key role in its reconstruc
tion(s), and remains today the most important premise of American
constitutionalism. Accordingly, "the People," as a heuristic device,
does a lot of work in these histories, giving rise to moments of rhe
torical populism.106 But this devotion to the People invites special
scrutiny, not least because these books will most likely not be read
by the people on the street.101
105. P. 307. Amar notes that an exception is constitutional criminal procedure, the sub
ject of another book. See p. 307 n.*; AKHn. REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMI
NAL PROCEDURE: Fmsr PRINCIPLES (1997).
106. See Ackerman p. x (stating in his acknowledgments that "I hope this book partially
repays my enormous debt to the institutions, and the country, that made it possible"); Amar,
Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REv.
1043, n.t (1988) (dedicating article to his father who asked him to write something "for the
people").
107. But see Amar p. 296 (stating that "this is a book written not just for lawyers and
judges but for ordinary citizens who care about our Constitution").
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The persistence of the principle of popular sovereignty over two
centuries does not mean that it conveys the same thing today as in
1781.10s Ackerman and Amar realize this, and they try to show
how the procedural mechanisms of popular sovereignty have
changed over time. They assume that, substantively, popular sover
eignty has always meant majoritarianism. Both are combatting the
problem of the "countermajoritarian difficulty"109 (i.e, judicial re
view) in constitutional studies in two ways. First, they shift focus
away from the Supreme Court to other institutions. Second, they
emphasize how profoundly majoritarian American constitutional
ism is, so that one can see, with Alexander Hamilton, that judicial
review is actually one more instrument of the people's will. 11°
Popular sovereignty, however, does not necessarily imply
majoritarian democracy - whether monist or dualist; invocations
of popular sovereignty have often been ambiguous, part devotion to
the people, part interested rhetorical strategy.111 At the very least,
the Founders, Federalist and anti-Federalist alike, were not simple
majoritarians.112 The democratic connotation of popular sover
eignty did not become widespread for decades after the Revolution
and involved a massive constitutional transformation almost unno
ticed in these books, perhaps because it took place at the state level.
That history is associated with the Jacksonian era, but even then it
resulted in a limited version of democracy, working toward univer
sal white male suffrage, the abolition of property qualifications for
elective office, and an increased number of elected officials.113 The
trend resumed in the Progressive Era, which saw the extension of
the vote to women (especially native-born white women), initiatives
and referenda, and directly elected Senators.
108. For an excellent study of the concept before 1787, see EDMUND S. MORGAN,
!NvENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
(1988).
109. See ALEXANDER M.
110. See THE
1961).

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) at 524-25 (Jacob E. Cooke ed.

1 1 1 . See Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT:
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948); MoRGAN, supra note 108; G. Edward White, Reading the
Guarantee Clause, U. CoLO. L. R.Ev. 787 (1994) (criticizing Amar for equating popular sover
eignty with majoritarianism).
112. Amar embraces a much less complicated notion of majoritarianism than Ackerman.

In addition to The Bill ofRights, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning ofRepublican
ism: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. CoLo. L.
R.Ev. 749 (1994). Still, both believe that American constitutional culture has been essentially
majoritarian from its beginning.
113. See DEMOCRACY, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1968); see also
Morton J. Horwitz & Orlando de Campo, Wizen and How the Supreme Court Found Democ
racy
A Computer Study, 14 QuINNIPIAC L.J. 1 (1994) (graphing the slow shift in judges'
use of "democracy" in nineteenth and twentieth centuries). For brief references, see
Ackerman p. 270; FoUNDATIONs, supra note 2, at 76-77.
-
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To date, the constitutional history of Progressivism remains un
written. When it is, Ackerman's compression of his third constitu
tional moment to the 1930s may seem less persuasive - as Amar
suggests in his afterword.114 Instead, constitutional development
will be seen to have played out on a larger stage of social and intel
lectual change, turning on the construction and legitimation of the
administrative state. It is an interesting question, for example, how
one might reconcile Ackerman's New Deal with that of legal histo
rian Edward Purcell Jr.115 let alone that of social historian Lizabeth
Cohen, to name just some who have helped excavate the 1930s.
The people in Cohen's book, Making a New Deal, for example, do
not look much like the People in Ackerman's. Cohen's people had
racial, ethnic, class, regional, and other identities. They were not
passive consumers of political debates, responding yea or nea to the
calls from the federal capital. Instead, they absorbed media in a
much more complicated manner, reinterpreting political news and a
host of mass-distributed signs in unexpected ways.116 Maybe there
was a "deeper" story being scripted in Washington, D.C., in 1936;
but how was that text read? Did voters believe they were engaged
in a referendum on a constitutional "amendment-analogue"? Quite
plausibly many did. It is equally plausible that most voted along
(literally) familiar party lines. Possibly many accepted FDR be
cause he lived up to his promise to do something - though that
something remained unrealized, unclear, and controversial - and
that when others rejected Alf Landon they were rejecting Alf Lan
don, not embracing a new constitutional paradigm. These explana
tions are all probably true to some extent. To find out which are
more true than others would require more research, in a wider vari
ety of sources, than has hitherto been attempted. Court opinions,
presidential speeches, and election returns will not carry the burden
of proof.117 Perhaps it is a proposition that will not admit of histori
cal proof - or disproof. That FDR was popular, and the Supreme
Court's doctrine was not, and that the latter changed - somehow,
at some point - and came into accord with the program of the
114. See Amar p. 300 (surveying the Progressive amendments and asking whether it is
"necessary to postulate an unwritten amendment in the 1930s to account for a more national
ist and redistributive constitutional regime in the twentieth century").
115. See EDWARD A. PuRCELL JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM <;IF VALUE (1973).
116. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO,
1919-1939 (1990).
117. Michael Kammen cleared some ground in A MACHINE THAT WouLD Go OF ITSELF.
THE CoNSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CuLTURE 255-81 (1986). Ackerman applauds a study of
public support for FDR's court-packing plan before and after the Supreme Court's "switch"
in 1937, which indicates that a majority of the polled public approved the plan as a means to
defeat judicial obstructionism. P. 324. But support for court-packing is not the same thing as
support for a de facto constitutional amendment.
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former, is enough for Ackerman. Constitutional change happened;
therefore the People willed it to happen. He is interested in the
political process - the constitutional process - of unconventional
amendment, not the cultural conflict behind it, so he can be for
given for leaving out from what is already a substantial undertaking
the sort of close historical analysis necessary to explain a shift in
constitutional meaning. The problem is that his method of research
and argumentation bear an uncertain relation to his ultimate claim
that the People, en masse, participated in the process.
To bolster his cultural history of the Constitution, Ackerman
uses a literary technique increasingly found in legal scholarship: the
fictitious voice.118 In Ackerman's case, it speaks in a monologue:
"the Prophetic Voice" of We the People. This device is new to Vol
ume 2 and is meant to be critical. But unlike most law review dra
matis personae, Ackerman's lacks irony. The People speak truth,
clearly. Listen as the Prophetic Voice opens chapter one:

My fellow Americans, we are in a bad way. We are drifting. Our
leaders are compromising, compromised. They have lost sight of gov
ernment's basic purposes.
It is time for us to take the future into our own hands. Each of us
has gained so much from life in America. Can we remain idle while
this great nation drifts downward?
No: We must join together in a movement for national renewal,
even if this means self-sacrifice. We will not stop until the govern
ment has heard our voice.
The People must retake control of government. We must act deci
sively to bring the law in line with the promise of American life. [p. 3]
Ackerman reenters the book to observe that " [s]ince the first
Englishmen colonized America, this voice has never been silent."
The Voice is a composite of a Puritan Jeremiah,119 Walter
Lippman,120 Herbert Croly,121 Franklin D. Roosevelt,122 John F.
Kennedy,123 evangelical nationalists,124 civil rights protestors, and
118. See, e.g., DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BorroM OF THE WELL (1992); RICHARD
DELGADO,

THE

RODRIGO CHRONICLES:

CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND RACE

(1995). Ackerman has long been interested in the role of "storytelling" in the law. See RB.
CONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 29, 31, 52-55, 73.

THE AMERICAN JEREMIAD (1978).
wALTER LIPPMAN, DRIFT AND MASTERY! AN ATTEMPT TO

119. See SACVAN BERCOVITCH,
120. See

DIAGNOSE THE

CURRENT UNREST (1914).

121. See HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN

LIFE (1909).

122. The phrase "My fellow Americans" evokes Roosevelt's fireside chats. See 2
Roosevelt, The First "Fireside Chat" - An Intimate Talk with the People ofthe United States
on Banking. March I2, 1933, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 61-65 (1938).
123. See John F. Kennedy, Inaugural
READER 7-11 (Jay David ed., 1967).

Address, January 20, 1961, in THE

KENNEDY

124. See PERRY MILLER, The Evangelical Basis, in THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA
3-95 (1965).
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others. The melody is eclectic, though Progressive tones dominate.
It sounds more prosperous than not, with the peremptory cadence
of talk radio. The Voice speaks rarely in Ackerman's pages, but it
remains the protagonist. "It is this voice that will concern us here,
as well as the distinctive attitude Americans have cultivated in its
exercise" (p. 3). Listen, and government will be returned to the
People's control.
Why the Prophetic Voice? Perhaps its most arresting quality is
that it sounds so different from another abstraction influencing
legal studies, an abstraction that Ackerman has explored elsewhere:
the Market.125 The Voice shows faith in human agency, affirmative
social justice, and redistribution - at least of political power.
When the government is out of control, the People should reassert
power, not repose faith in the invisible hand.
But is government out of the People's control? Certainly the
federal government sometimes appears to be so, especially when
observed on Washington-originated news programs: repetition,
punditry, stone-skipping history, and much talk of the People.
Change the channel, however, and a more meaningful, if more tedi
ous, government comes into focus. On local access channels, little
is heard of the People; instead, actual people discuss concrete
needs, desires, and fears. There one hears about tax rates, public
improvements, and education. Then there are the myriad contro
versies about the physical environment in which people live and
work each day, all the tough, sometimes nasty social and cultural
politics that fall under the rubric of zoning. To find out what popu
lar sovereignty means today, it may be time to take a new look at
local government.
Along with zooming in on the local world, one might pan out
beyond the nation. Of course, deciphering the past is difficult
enough. Still, query whether the jurisdictions studied in these
books - the United States, as a nation and constituent states will remain the primary units of jurisdictional analysis in law
schools of the future. With the resurgence of zip-code identity on
the one hand, and world wide web access on the other, where pre
cisely will nationality fit in? Reports of the nation-state's death
have been exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is unclear how Ackerman's
and Amar's students will receive the professors' nationalist narra
tive. To the historian of twenty-first century consciousness, any dis
junction might indicate changing recruitment and socialization
within that profession or between its scholars and practitioners.
Of course, the nation will not pass. But it will continue to
change shape, and its claims on the identity of its citizens will
125. See generally RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7.
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change too. Similarly, any decline of national identity would not
mean the decline of the United States. Is there a framework for
understanding how people might draw on several political identities
simultaneously, emphasizing one for certain purposes and a second
or third for others? Consider that the United States emerged from
an early modern empire, became gradually in the nineteenth cen
tury a nation, and may now be metamorphosing again into another
kind of empire, one marked by the diffuse but palpable spread of its
culture, including its legal culture. It is a special kind of imperial
ism, full of informal modes of operation, more like those of the
early modern period than the nineteenth-century. Here is where
the pre-history of American constitutionalism might be instructive.
Ackerman writes that the prophetic Voice of the People has spoken
"[s]ince the first Englishmen colonized America" (p. 3) but is unin
terested in what it was saying for almost two centuries before 1787.
In the early modern world, English influence spread less through
official foreign policy than the "ventures" of privileged groups,
often joint-stock companies possessing, to one degree or another,
license from the crown. At various times the King, his Privy Coun
cil, or his agents in America tried to centralize imperial policy, fail
ing more often than not, so that it is only a bit of an exaggeration to
see the American Revolution as less a progressive fight for democ
racy than a reactionary defense of long (and not so long) accrued
local privileges against an increasingly interventionist central gov
ernment.126 Earlier it was argued that early modern localism was
greatly concerned with jurisdictions smaller than the state. These
were not just towns and counties. A corporation, for example,
could be a territorial jurisdiction, or it might be something else. As
the etymological fiction had it, corporations were alive. And they
moved. Or if the head - the governing board - was immobile,127
at least the arms might reach out to new lands, across political
boundaries, redrawing them in the process. This had been true of
corporations in the Anglophone world at least since the earliest set
tlement of the American continent, much of which was conducted
by groups organized as corporations.128 In short, such scripts did
not always protect "a local communitarian spirit."129 Claims of im
munity from central government could, paradoxically, serve impe
rial ambitions.
126. With some differences, this is the theme of GREENE, supra note 68.
127. For a mobile corporation council, see GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY
IN EARLY MAssACHUSErrs: A STUDY IN TRADmoN ANl:> DESIGN 15 {1960).
128. See 1 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 41
{1934).
129. P. 105; see also Carol M. Rose, Ancient Constitutionalism vs. the Federalist Empire:
Anti-Federalism from the Attacks on "Monarchism" to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv.
74 (1989).
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Today's functional equivalents might be multinational corpora
tions. The multinational is just that: operative in many jurisdic
tions, ambivalently related to each. But usually it speaks
American-English, and so too its default legal vocabulary derives
from the United States. The global marketplace, after all, looks
and sounds familiar. Negotiating among these corporations are the
new diplomats, investment bankers and consultants; a top-notch
American professional degree (more often M.B.A. than J.D.)130 re
placing striped pants as the anthropological marker. More perti
nent to the books at hand is the influence of U.S. constitutionalism
abroad. The federal Constitution has long been an international
model, at least a source of concepts and vocabulary carried abroad
by legal missionaries. The Founders claimed (as both Ackerman
and Amar approvingly note) that they were contributing to "the
Science of Politics";131 it was to be a constitution on a hill, a beacon
to those less fortunate. Witness the constitutional scholars who
flocked to Eastern Europe ten years ago, as well as the traditional
conflation of U.S. constitutional norms and universal values.132 The
old historical debate here about the sources of U.S. legal culture
(Anglicization? Americanization?) may soon replicate itself, with
cosmopolitan mutations, at an international level (Americaniza
tion? globalization?). Thus American ideas may well dominate
global constitutionalism, and so discussion of the standards of legiti
mate constitutional change may persist. But five-step formulae and
American paradigm cases will probably not "translate"133 out of the
present historical situation.134
When highlighting the popular sovereignty premise of Ameri
can constitutionalism, both are indebted to the "republican revival"
in early American history. But times are changing in the history
departments and republicanism, liberalism, and the ideological in
terpretation are not what they used to be. Gordon Wood's Creation
130. See Bruce Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in NoMos XXII: PROPERTY
351, 372 (1980) (noting that "new professions" pose a "challenge [to] the dominion of the
traditional American caste of public policymakers - called lawyers").
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), at 51 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).
132. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REvoLUITON (1992); CoN
STITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSIDONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD (Douglas
Greenberg et al. eds., 1993). The reflexive conflation of United States and universal law is no
new theme in the new nation - "A world of our empire, for a world of our laws," wrote
lawyer and Connecticut wit David Humphreys in the 1790s. The equation persists, as
Michael J. Sandel has remarked about the work of Ronald Dworkin. MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 145-46 (1982).
133. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1165 (1993).
134. See ACKERMAN, supra note 132 (on the "velvet revolutions" as a constitutional mo
ment for Eastern Europe); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise ofWorld Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L.
REv. 771, 774-75 (1997) (warning law professors that "[i]f we fail to contribute our fair share
to the analysis of world constitutionalism, it will be tough for others to fill the vacuum" while
warning that "the American experience [i]s a special case, not . . . the paradigmatic case").
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will for a long time remain the best
study of the constitution-making period. But it must be supple
mented by newer work in social and institutional history, and stud
ies just emerging from the renaissance of Atlantic history.136 Of
course, republicanism is not going away; it was not just a product of
the Cold War. It will, however, be assimilated into an ever ex
panding historiographical repertoire, as historians turn to other old
and new frameworks to understand the movement of people and
ideas throughout the world. Whiggish histories of how Americans
perfected the science of politics are already turning stale, as histori
ans become more skeptical of national exceptionalism and tri
umphalism (the juggernaut of popular sovereignty included).
Consequently, the historical premise of both Ackerman and Amar
seems a bit dated. But often fashions change too fast in the acad
emy, and some interpretations deserve the long half-life they enjoy
in the survey literature. The question is why embellish this one
now? Or, what is the point of reconstructing American constitu
tional history as the progressive vindication of popular sovereignty?

of the American Republic135

III.

THE NEW

LEGAL HISTORICISM137

Criticisms of Ackerman's and Amar's historical interpretations
are open to the charge of irrelevance because they (especially
Ackerman)138 deny that they are writing professional history. In
stead, they are trying to rewrite (again, in Ackerman's terms) the
"professional narrative" of constitutional change. Theirs are explic
itly forward-looking, usable pasts, not so much "lawyers' history,"
"forensic history," or "lawyers' legal history"139 as history for law
yers. Which is to say that their historical constitutionalism is in
tended less to add weapons to the advocate's arsenal than to change
the way the legal community conceptualizes the Constitution and
change beneath it.
135. GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1972).
136. For a history of the idea of Atlantic history and a partial prospectus, see BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEA OF ATLANTIC HISTORY (International Seminar on the History of the At
lantic World, Harvard University, Working Paper No. 96-01, 1996).
137. Cf. BROOK THOMAS, THE NEW HISTORICISM AND OTHER OLD-FASHIONED TOPICS
(1991).
138. "There is lots of history in this book, some political science, a little philosophy - but
these interdisciplinary excursions are in the service of a fundamentally legal enterprise." P.
28.

139. Good discussions of this problem include Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Mod
em American Constitutionalism, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 523 (1995); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 119 ("law-office history"); William E.
Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237 (1986)
(distinguishing "lawyers' legal history" and "historians' legal history"); and John P. Reid,
Law and History, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 193, 203 (1993) ("forensic history").
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At some level, this concern with legitimating constitutional
change is a measure of the success of conservative originalism.140
Proposed amendments to undo postwar liberal jurisprudence and
candid, actuarial court-packing suggested to Ackerman a stultifying
"hypertextualism" on the one hand and a "legal realist" approach
to constitutionalism on the other - the tasteless extremes, he
thinks, of the constitutional menu offered in today's law schools.
He criticizes both and works to define a middle road for constitu
tional theory.141 In a different way, Amar's "one-two synthesis" of
the Founding and Reconstruction (p. 300), showing how and when
the rights-oriented Bill became "America's Parthenon" (p. xi), is
implicitly designed to refute the deliberately ahistorical, plain
meaning version of textualism that might undermine those rights, as
well as cast doubt on historically untethered, extratextual rights.
A frustrating aspect of Amar's book is that he never discusses
his minor premise: that historically informed textualism is the cor
rect way to interpret the Constitution today. He assumes that if his
history and interpretations are correct they should be the standard
against which to measure constitutional law. Even if he is right
about that history and those interpretations, this is a large assump
tion and needs more support. He never explicitly discusses the
plain meaning textual approach. He never explains, as Ackerman
does, why his method is preferable to democratic "monism" or neo
Kantian rights jurisprudence. About unenumerated rights, he
writes that "we need a good account of these rights before we can
use open-ended language to interpolate between and extrapolate
beyond these textual rights."142 One might agree with this ap
proach, but is its legitimacy self-evident?
Ackerman is more explicit about his methods. Many have
talked about the importance of legal consciousness, but few agree
on what it is and how it might be changed.143 Ackerman actually
wants to alter the profession's consciousness; given the number of
pages he publishes and reviews he receives, he may. Not all of his
discursive innovations will survive the Darwinist process of law
school mainstreaming, but many will
some already have. After
-

140. See KALMAN, supra note 61, at 132-43 (discussing the "tum to history" in the legal
academy).
141. This is not the first time Ackerman has embraced and transformed the methodolo
gical innovations of those whose politics conflict with his own. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra
note 7, at 42-45 (challenging law professors to accept techniques of law and economics while
rejecting its conclusions).
142. P. 299. While Amar claims that he is not opposed to judicial protection of
unenumerated rights, his tone, at least, suggests serious reservations about them. See, e.g., p.
297 (referring to the "'these are a few of my favorite rights"' style of constitutional theory).
143. See REcoNSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 70-71.
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Ronald Dworkin, he is arguably the preeminent liberal jurisprudent
of his generation.
He means to make the most of his lectern. Long ago Ackerman
flagged socialization as integral to the "reconstruction" of Ameri
can law. It was imperative, he wrote, "to consider how the law
shapes social perception and evaluation through a complex process
of education and indoctrination."144 At the same time, "no group
of professionals can survive economically, sociologically, spiritually
without a general sense that it provides a distinctive service of
value."145 In other words, law - its institutions and discourses influences valuation; but in tum, the legal community demands that
its resources be normatively grounded. A basic narrative of consti
tutional history might change that conceptual basis and supply
those values. Historical integrity is not the point. Professional in
tegrity is.
So Ackerman has constructed the most ambitious outline of
American legal history since that of Roscoe Pound.146 Like Pound,
Ackerman is trying to awaken the profession to its formative eras.
He too is drawn to social science methods, and he has an uncom
fortable but intellectually genetic relation to legal realism (Pound a
pedantic, long-lived ancestor,147 Ackerman a scolding heir). Miss
ing, of course, is Pound's academic Germanophilia. Indeed, a strik
ing aspect of Ackerman's work is its fealty to English-American
ways. "I have been trying," he writes early in Transformations, "to
redeem the promise of Anglo-American legal method" (p. 66).
Similarly, in Foundations he complained that his colleagues' "ex
alted talk of Kant and Locke only emphasizes the elitism involved
in removing fundamental questions from the democratic process"148
and then celebrated the empirical, "Burkean" common lawyer:
\Vhat counts for the common lawyer is not some fancy theory but the
patterns of concrete decision built up by courts and other practical
decisionmakers over decades, generations, centuries. . . . The task of
the Burkean lawyer or judge is to master these precedents, thereby
gaining a sense of their hidden potentials for growth and decay.149

What Ackerman means by the common law is not always clear
(not, of course, an idiosyncratic problem).150 At times common law
144. Id. at 71.
145. Id. at 19.
146. See RoscoE PoUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW (Peter Smith ed.,
1950).
147. See N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1997).
148. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 12.
149. Id. at 17. On Ackerman's use of Burke, see Moglen, supra note 42, at 547-52.
150. "Ask a Lawyer, What is Co=on Law?
He knows not what common law is
Jeremy Bentham Mss., University College, London, cited in DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROV• • .

• • • •"
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method means simply respect for precedent. At others it sounds
like evolutionary custom. It can also mean the induction of
principle from the raw material of legal behavior on the ground.
Once found, it remains the same, even as its derivative rules and
applications mutate,151 not unlike the fivefold formula of constitu
tional amendment. Finally, Ackerman's common law recalls
Pound's distinction between law in action and law in books. "For
common lawyers," Ackerman writes, "the key is not what a court
says, but what it does."152 So too it is with the Constitution, prac
tice fleshing out text.
Of these, abstraction most characterizes his history. Take for
example his metaphor in Foundations illustrating the contention
that "the path of the law is from the particularistic to comprehen
sive analysis":

Think of the American Republic as a railroad train, with the judges of
the middle republic sitting in the caboose, looking backward. What
they see are the mountains and valleys of dualistic constitutional ex
perience, most notably the peaks of constitutional meaning elabo
rated during the Founding and Reconstruction. As the train moves
forward in history, it is harder for the judges to see the traces of vol
canic ash that marked each mountain's political emergence onto the
legal landscape. At the same time, a different perspective becomes
more available: as the second mountain moves into the background,
it becomes easier to see that there is now a mountain range out there
that can be described in a comprehensive way.153
This is remarkable: the judiciary as a backward-looking institution,
struggling to make sense of the whole constitutional experience,
constantly moving out from the specific intent of a transformative
amendment toward its more general, fundamental meaning. As
with so much of Ackerman's elegant analysis, it is hard to refute,
standing as it does on its own premises and following the logic of
induction almost instinctive to lawyers. The result is a wonderful
picture. Start with the way it naturalizes constitutional develop
ment, leaving the judiciary as an artificial element in the land
scape,154 with no agency but passive, myopic observation. Forget
the concrete, contingent, human disputes that fuel litigation. When
that surface grime is cleaned away, the masterpiece is revealed.
The Supreme Court's role is less to say what the Constitution is
than gradually behold the wonders of constitutional creation, as
INCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENfH-CENTURY BRITAIN
235 n.71 (1989).
151. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 43 n.13.
152. P. 246; see also p. 360.
153. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 98-99.
154. A familiar trope of American romanticism. See LEo MA.Rx, THE MACHINE IN THE
GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA (1964).
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Justices glimpse beyond the picturesque (or not so picturesque) to
the beautiful, perhaps farther. Theirs is an art of mimesis. But it is
just a metaphor. Ultimately, Ackerman remains a constitutional
positivist; the law may be sublime but not otherworldly. Deus ex
machina is the People. And the Court does play an active role of
"intergenerational synthesis," an idea rehearsed quickly in the first
two volumes and the promised subject of the third, Interpretations.
The highlight there will be his treatment of Brown v. Board of
Education.155
Ackerman is genuinely concerned with how unrooted the legal
presumptions of his generation seem, how susceptible they have
been to conservative attack: originalism and textualism in the case
of constitutional jurisprudence, invocations of the market in private
law. He has asked whether his is "a generation of betrayal"156 be
cause it has not persuasively justified the New Deal or the Supreme
Court's postwar civil rights cases. Which might be to say that it has
yet to answer the question of whether Brown adheres to a neutral
principle.157 Ackerman's civics lesson is designed to tutor lawyers
in more creative ways of apprehending both the New Deal and
postwar liberal jurisprudence. He hopes to replace the Lochner im
age of judicial review,158 which led to the countermajoritarian inter
pretation, with a popular sovereignty one. The goal is to
demonstrate that a synthesis of Reconstruction's popularly
accepted principle of racial equality with the New Deal's popularly
accepted principle of the national welfare state justifies Brown.159
This is a laudable jurisprudential objective, notwithstanding its his
torical simplifications. But communal narratives have their ambig
uous side (not least because resistant to conscious rewriting);
orthodox theories tend to scant heterodox practices.160 And query
whether his legitimacy-inducing narrative, especially as it achieves
some autonomy from its author, may support something other than
155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
156. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. RE.v. 1519 (1997).
157. The question posed by Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu·
tional Law, 73 HARV. L. RE.v. 1 (1959). See also Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicenten·
nia� 87 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 1565, 1599-602 (1987) (arguing that "Ackerman proposes to
construct a new understanding of judicial review different from the traditional view of that
doctrine as 'countermajoritarian."').
158. See Steven A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. RE.v. 1 (1991).
159. Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamental·
ity Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. RE.v. 32 (1993) (arguing that modem constitu
tionalism ought to rest on a substantive, not a procedural, theory of democracy).
160. Although Ackerman and Amar are committed to demonstrating that the Constitu
tion has changed over time, they hesitate to acknowledge that multiple interpretations might
exist at any one time.
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Ackerman's version of popular sovereignty.161 And it is rare to find
a modem legal theory in which the Weberian concept of legitima
tion has such a positive connotation. 162 It is not for the faint of
heart, this project of uncritical, mythic history. The standard of suc
cess is not acceptance among professional historians, political scien
tists, or philosophers; success, on Ackerman's own terms, depends
on the absorption of his narrative into the legal community. Hence
his emphasis on taxonomy and structure. He may judge the project
a success if, when lawyers talk about the Constitution, they talk in
terms of moments, constitutional politics, eruptions (but very con
trolled eruptions) of the People, and so forth, even if many dispute
his analysis here and there. In consciousness formation, control
over vocabulary is half the battle, as Ackerman learned when strug
gling with the law and economics movement. The model is in the
language, not separate from it. Accept Ackerman's language and
you are pretty much lodged inside his conceptual world, whether or
not it is the world we have lost or know now. Only time will tell if
this new civics can produce the constitutional world of the future.

161. Such uncertainty is now treated as a mark of a rigorous constitutional theory. See
Amar p. 297 ("In a textualist book . I was obliged to confront the stubborn text that stands
between the words of Amendment I and III"); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text:
Rethinking the Constitutional Relationship Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DuKE L.J. 1,
54 ("One could reach nearly any substantive result . . . from within the interpretive frame
work that I reco=end.").
162. Ackerman has previously referred to the need to create a legitimating consciousness
to support the law, citing Max Weber. See REcoNSTRUCTING, supra note 7, at 71 n.31;
Ackerman, supra note 130, at 372 (1980). For a different, Gramscian approach to conscious
ness and legitimation, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57
(1984).
.
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